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THE DOCTRINE OF THE AMENDABILITY OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
HUGH EVANDER WILLIS*
One of the two doctrines written into the United States Con-
stitution by the framers in the Constitutional Convention was
the doctrine of the amendability of the constitution. But so
many matters both of method and scope of the power of amend-
ment have had to be worked out by the Supreme Court since
the Constitutional Convention, by methods of interpretation,
that a large part of the authorship of the doctrine will now have
to be attributed to the justices of the United States Supreme
Court.
The methods whereby the United States Constitution can be
amended may be classified as legal and extra-legal or revolution-
ary. The framers in the Constitutional Convention were them-
selves exercising the revolutionary method in drafting a new
constitution to take the place of the Articles of Confederation,'
but they provided in their own new constitution for legal
methods of amendment.2
Under Article V, provision is made for the proposal of amend-
ments in two different ways, either by "two-thirds of both
* Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1 Cooley, Constitutional Law (3rd) 15; Federalist No. 43.
2 "The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it nec-
essary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, or, on the applica-
tion of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a
convention for proposing amendments; which, in either case, shall be valid,
to all intents and purposes, as part of this ConstitUtion, when ratified by
the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by conventions
in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may
be proposed by Congress: Provided, That no amendment which may be
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houses" of Congress, or by a convention called by Congress for
proposing amendments "on the application of the legislatures of
two-thirds of the several states." It should be observed that
Congress takes the important action in the proposal of amend-
ments. Where it does not propose the amendments itself, it is
necessary to have it call a convention for proposing amendments.
Where Congress itself proposes amendments, it generally does
so in the form of a joint resolution, though the proposal can be
in the form of a bill, but it should be observed that in the
amending process Congress is not legislating but exercfsing a
part of the peculiar amending power.
The two-thirds requirement means two-thirds of a quorum of
each house.3 It has been argued that under the language of
Article V there must be an express declaration that Congress
"dgems it necessary" before an amendment can be legally pro-
posed, but the Supreme Court has held otherwise.4 One question
which came up early was whether or not the approval of the
made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any
manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first
article; and that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its
equal suffrage in the Senate." U. S. Const., Art. V.
All of the states of the Union now have constitutions in which there
are provisions for amendment, but the methods of amendment vary greatly,
and for this reason, in this article only the amendment of the United
States Constitution will be fully considered. There is some similarity,
however, among the provisions of the different state constitutions. Gen-
erally, an amendment or amendments may be proposed by either house,
either by a majority vote, or a three-fifths vote, or a two-thirds vote, but
such amendments are required to be passed by two successive legislatures
and then ratified either by a majority vote, or a three-fifths vote, or a
two-thirds vote of the people. Some state constitutions provide for a gen-
eral revision by a convention. (Stimson, Federal and State Constitutions,
Sees. 990-995.) Where there is no such provision, the courts generally
hold that there is an implied power in the legislature to provide for the
calling of a constitutional convention, or at least to provide for submis-
sion to the voters of such a question. 5 Ind. Law Jour. 329, note 1; 12
C. J. 683, 684.
Because of its power over the admission of new states, Congress has
the power to control both the subject-matter and method of adoption of
constitutions of new states, and if Congress admits a state into the Union
with such a constitution so adopted it becomes the constitution of that
state though never submitted to the people, but after admission Congress
loses any further power over state constitutions. Brittle v. People, 2 Nebr.
98 (1873).
3 National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350 (1920).
4 National Prohibition Cases, supra.
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president was necessary. The Supreme Court answered this
question in the negative at an early date,5 and more recently
confirmed its early decision.6
Could Congress propose an entirely new constitution? This
question has not been answered, although it would be a safe
guess that if it would its action would be revolutionary and only
legal when ratified by the people.7 After the proposal of an
amendment, can Congress withdraw it? The correct view would
seem to be that the proposal is an irrevocable act and that Con-
gress cannot withdraw it. Certainly, one house of Congress
could not withdraw its action.8
Where the other method of proposing amendments is invoked,
it should be observed that neither Congress itself nor the states
can call a convention on its own initiative. The legislatures of
two-thirds of the states may apply for and then it is the duty
of Congress to call a constitutional convention. Apparently a
majority of Congress could issue the call, but suppose such a
majority should refuse? Under the doctrine of separation of
powers, no pressure could be brought upon Congress. There is
no constitutional method of coercing Congress to perform its
constitutional duty. When would two-thirds of the legislatures
have made application for a call? Must the request be simul-
taneous or approximately so? It would seem that it should be
held that they must be reasonably approximate. Must the re-
quest seek a convention for identical purposes? Perhaps the
answer to this question should be in the negative. Who has the
authority to fix the time and place of the convention? Should
such a convention represent the states or the people as an
aggregate? It would seem that because of the silence of the
Constitution, these matters are left within the power of Con-
gress. Could such a convention propose a wholly new constitu-
tion? If it should do this, it would seem that its act would be
revolutionary and not legal until ratified by the people.9 The
better view seems to be that a convention is not subject to the
5 Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dallas 378 (1798).
6 Hawke v. Smith, 253 U. S. 221, 229 (1920). The proposed Corwin
Amendment and the Thirteenth Amendment were inadvertently signed by
the President.
7 Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336, (1912).
8 Orfield, The Procedure of the Federal Amending Power, 25 InI. Law
Rev. 429.
9 Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. 59 (1874).
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legislative branch of the government, but that it is bound by
the existing Constitution.10
Under Article V, provision is made for three different methods
of ratification. One of these relates only to depriving a state of
its equal suffrage in the Senate. An amendment of this sort
must be ratified by the state involved, as well as by the requisite
total two-thirds. As to all other matters, an amendment may be
ratified either by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states
or by conventions in three-fourths of the states, as Congress
may choose. Here is one power over ratification given to Con-
gress, but it has no others.". But it should be noted that a
limitation may be incorporated in the submitted amendment
itself.12
Where ratification is by convention, a question which might
arise would be, Can an amendment be ratified by conventions
when Congress submits it to the state legislatures? In the case
of the proposed Corwin Amendment, an Illinois convention un-
dertook to do this. But it would seem that the case of United
States v. Sprague's had settled this question in the negative.
Some difficulty might arise as to the power of state legislatures
and Congress over state conventions, but it should be remem-
10 In the case of a state convention, this would mean both the existing
state constitution and the federal Constitution.
On the powers of constitutional conventions, there have been two di-
vergent views. One reduces the powers of a convention below that of the
legislature. Carton v. Secretary of State, 151 Mich. 337 (1908); In re
Op. of Justices, 76 N. H. 612 (1889); Wells v. Bain, 75 Pa. 39 (1874);
Ex p. Birmingham etc. R. Co., 145 Ala. 514 (1905);Foley v. Orleans etc.
Com., 138 La. 220 (1915); In re Op. of Justices, 6 Cush. 573 (1833). The
other makes the convention independent of the legislature and a direct rep-
resentative of the people and endowed with all the powers given to it sub-
ject to the existing constitution. (Some cases even go so far as to say
that it has not even this limitation, but it would seem that when a con-
vention violates the Constitution it is doing a very revolutionary thing.)
Sproule v. Fredericks, 69 Miss. 898 (1892); Frantz v. Autry, 18 Okla. 561
(1907); Loomis v. Jackson, 6 W. Va. 613 (1873).
Can such a convention promulgate a constitution without submission to
the people? Not legally, unless the Constitution so provides, but it can
as a revolutionary thing, and if such action is accepted by the people so
as to make it a success, the Constitution so promulgated becomes a valid
constitution. Miller v. Johnson, 92 Ky. 589 (1892); Taylor v. Common.
wealth, 101 Va. 829 (1903); Thorpe, Cowst. Hist. Am. Peo. 113-132.
11 United States v. Sprague, 51 S. Ct. 220.
12 7 A. B. A. 656.
13 51 S. Ct. 220.
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bered that such conventions are really instrumentalities, neither
of the state governments, nor of the national government, but
of the sovereign people acting under Article V of the Consti-
tution.1 4
Where the ratification is by state legislatures, the method
which has so far been used, the usual procedure is for the Secre-
tary of State to send a copy of the proposed amendment to the
governor of each state, who in turn submits it to the legislature,
but it would seem that a state legislature could proceed without
these steps. A number of questions have arisen in connection
with ratification by state legislatures. For example, Is the
governor's approval necessary? Can a constitution of a state
require a referendum? Can a state reject after ratifying or
ratify after rejecting? It should be borne in mind that a legis-
lature in ratifying is not legislating, but is performing a func-
tion concerning the amendment process. For this reason, it has
been held that the governor's approval is not necessary,15 and
that the requirement of a referendum is illegal, 16 and that rati-
fication is a final act, so that it cannot be withdrawn, but that
rejection is not a final act and may be withdrawn, since the Con-
stitution mentions only ratification and not rejection.' 7 A ques-
tion of a little more difficulty is, Can a legislature prescribe a
breathing spell before its legislatures shall act, that is, can it
provide that an amendment shall be ratified only by a legislature
elected after the proposal of an amendment? It has been argued
that the people of a state have this power,' but it is doubtful
whether or not this argument is sound, since the state legisla-
tures derive their authority directly from the people as a whole
through Article V.19 A question arises over whether or not
ratification by three-fourths of the state legislatures means
three-fourths of the loyal states, or three-fourths of the whole
number of states,, which affects the validity of the Civil War
14 Orfield, The Procedure of the Federal Amending Power, 25 Ill. Law
Rev. 432.
15 Dodd, Amending the Federal Constitution, 30 Yale Law Jour. 321,
346.
16 Hawke v. Smith, 253 U. S. 221 (1920).
17 Garrett, Amending the Federal Constitution, 7 Tenn. L. Rev. 294;
Jameson, Constitutional Conventions (4th), 575, 582-584; 30 Am. L. Rev.
894.
Is 14 Va. Law Rev. 191.
19 Orfield, The Procedure of the Federal Amending Power, 25 Ill. Law
Rev. 435.
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Amendments, but the Supreme Court has hinted that this is a
political question rather than a judicial question.20 Five amend-
ments proposed by Congress have not as yet been ratified by the
states. Two were proposed in 1789, one in 1810, one in 1861, and
the Child Labor Amendment, in 1924. Are these amendments still
pending? The answer would have to be No, as to all except the
Child Labor Amendment, since the Supreme Court has held
that an amendment will last only a reasonable length of time. 2'
As to the time of the adoption of an amendment, it has been
thought that it should be the time of the proclamation of ratifica-
tion by the Secretary of State, but the Supreme Court has held
that the amendment is adopted with the approval by the last
state necessary to make up the three-fourths majority,22 since
the proclamation by the Secretary of State is a congressional
matter, and the law of amendment is found in Article V. But the
Supreme Court has held that it would not go back of the certifi-
cate of a Secretary of State that an amendment had been ratified
and inquire into the legislative proceedings. 23
The reasons for the incorporation into our Constitution of a
doctrine of amendability of the Constitution are partly historical
and partly philosophical. The Articles of Confederation could
be amended only by unanimous consent. The Pennsylvania
Charter was the only one of the colonial charters which provided
for amendment. The first state constitutions made no provisions
for amendment, but by 1787, eight of the state constitutions had
provided for amendment. The doctrine is essentially an Ameri-
can doctrine. Experience with the first written constitutions
showed the need of such a provision. The members of the Con-
stitutional Convention realized that there were many matters
of constitutional importance, such as the question of a dual
form of government, the question of who should decide questions
of constitutionality, social control of corporations, acquisition
of new territory, power of taxation, control of elections, re-elec-
tion of the President, removals from office, the spoils system, the
20 White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646 (1871).
21 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U. S. 368 (1921).
It should be observed that in this case the limitation was not a part
of the congressional resolution, but a part of the Eighteenth Amendment
itself. The court evidently overlooked this and assumed that it was the
former. 7 A. B. A. 656.
22 Dillon v. Gloss, supra; Fairchild v. United States, 258 U. S. 126
(1922).
23 Leser v. Garnett, 258 U. S. 130 (1922); 14 Va. L. Rev. 196.
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control of concentration of wealth, which had been omitted from
the constitution, and they also realized that there were many
matters included in the Constitution which might need change
with the change of conditions. One of these expressly stated in
the Constitution involves the institution of slavery, but un-
doubtedly they also foresaw the possibility of the need of change
in the method of election of a President and in the allocation of
powers to the different branches of government under their
doctrine of separation of powers. Hence, there was general
agreement in the Constitutional Convention that some provision
should be made for amendment. Dispute arose over the methods
of amendment and the scope of amendment. Various proposals
were made. Some provided for the proposal of amendments
only by Congress; others only by the state legislatures. Others
provided for ratification only by state legislatures; others by
convention. Finally, due to the work of Madison, the present
methods of proposal and ratification were adopted. Dispute
arose also over the scope of the amending power. Sherman pro-
posed to preserve the states against the possibility of destruc-
tion by a limitation on the amending power that no state should
be affected in its internal police. This limitation was not
adopted. But finally, as a result of Rutledge's work, an express
limitation on the amending power prior to 1808 was made, so as
to prevent a change of Article I, Set. 9, clauses 1 and 4, relating
to the slave trade and direct taxation, and as a result of the
work of Gouveneur Morris, a limitation on the amending power
was made "that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived
of its equal suffrage in the Senate."24
What is the scope of the amending power under Article V?
Probably the correct answer to this question is that it embraces
everything. In other words, that there are no legal limitations
whatever upon the power of amendment. If the limitations with
reference to the slave trade and direct taxation were ever true
limitations they became obsolete in 1808. Otherwise, the Six-
teenth Amendment would raise a question with reference to the
limitation as to direct taxation. The limitation in regard to
equal representation in the United States Senate, while a limita-
tion as to legal direct method of amendment, is not a limitation
upon indirect methods of amendment which would accomplish
the same result. Of course, it should be observed that any state
24 Orfield, Genesis of Article V, 14 Minn. Law Rev. 369; Garrett,
Amending the Federal Constitution, 7 Tenn. L. Rev. 286-292.
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can, by the language of the amendment itself, be deprived of its
equal representation by its own vote and the vote of thirty-five
others. This is apparently the only direct way of amending this
part of the Constitution, but there are various 'indirect ways
where the same result could be accomplished. It has been con-
tended with much plausibility that this clause in Article V
could itself be repealed in a legal manner.25 Whether or not this
could be done, certainly either the Senate itself could be abol-
ished or the states themselves could be abolished, and thereby
the provision as to equal representation be made nugatory. The
only argument against this is the argument that the provision
in regard to equal representation implies the continued existence
of the Senate and the states, but this is too heavy an implication
for such a limitation, and clearly is not the view of the United
States Supreme Court.26 This disposes of the only express limi-
tation upon the amending power.
But it has been contended that there are all sorts of implied
limitations upon the amending power. Thus, it has been sug-
gested that no amendment is valid unless it is germaine to some-
thing else in the Constitution, or if it is a grant of a new power,
or if it is legislative in form, or if it destroys the powers of the
states under the dual form of government, or if it changes the
protection of personal liberty ;27 but the United States Supreme
Court has brushed away all of these arguments, and has held
that there is no limitation that an amendment shall be germaine,
25 Von Holtz, Constitutional Law of the United States-note 52.
26 Leser v. Garnett, 258 U. S. 130 (1922).
27 Machen, Is the Fifteenth Amendment Void? 23 Harv. Law Rev. 169;
Abbot, Inalienable Rights in the Eighteenth Amendment, 20 Col. Law
Rev. 183; Brown, Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
54 Am. L. Rev. 843; Marbury, Limitations upon the Amending Power, 33
Harv. Law Rev. 223; White, Is There An Eighteenth Amendment?, 5 Cor-
nell Law Quar. 113; Norton, Losing Liberty Judicially; Stevenson, States'
Rights and National Prohibition; Beck, The Vanishing Rights of the
States; Selden Bacon, How the 10th Amendment Affected the 5th Article
of the Constitution, 16 Va. Law Rev. 771.
Attorneys, in arguing cases before the United States ,Supreme Court
also have made these points.
Other magazine and leading text writers have never advanced
such arguments: Cooley's Constitutional Limitations; Burdick, The Law
of the American Constitution; Hall, Constitutional Law; Willoughby, On
the Constitution of the United States; Orfield, The Scope of the Federal
Amending Power, 28 Mich. Law Rev. 550; Taft, Amendment of the Federal
AMENDABILITY OF THE CONSTITUTION
or not a new grant of power,28 because there is no test for deter-
mining when there is one and when the other; or that an amend-
ment shall not be in the form of legislation, because although
it may be impolitic to frame an amendment in this form, to
forbid the sovereign people from doing so would be to make the
agent greater than the principal, and the principal can legislate
directly if it chooses to do so ;29 or that an amendment shall not
destroy our dual form of government, because up to the fourth
period in our constitutional history it had been common to limit
the powers of the federal government by amendment, and if the
federal government can be limited in this way, so can the
states, by future amendments, and because if the framers of the
Constitution had desired to put this limitation on the amending
power, they would have voted for instead of against Sherman's
proposal ;30 or that the protection of personal liberty should not
be changed by future constitutional law.31
There are other more general reasons why there are no im-
plied limitations upon the amending power. The enumeration of
three express limitations (two now obsolete), as a matter of con-
struction, should be held to negative any implied limitations.
This is especially so when the records of the Constitutional Con-
vention show that the framers anticipated a wide use of the
amending power and even voted down suggestions for further
express limitations. The fact that there are no implied limita-
tions is further shown by the fact that Article V is independent
of all the other articles in the Constitution, both so far as con-
cerns the procedure of amendment and the substance of amend-
ment. The 10th Amendment did not reserve the amending
power which had already been delegated, but only the non-
delegated powers, and hence, it must be held, as it has been
held, that the 10th Amendment is not an amendment of Article
V. Hence, any implied limitations upon the amending power
would have to be made by the Supreme Court itself. The exer-
cise of such a power would be a dangerous thing for the court
Constitution, 16 Va. Law Rev. 647; Lee, Abolishing the Senate by Amend-
ment, 16 Va. Law Rev. 364.
28 Leser v. Garnett, 258 U. S. 130 (1922) ; National Prohibition Cases,
253 U. S. 350 (1920); United States v. Sprague, 51 S. Ct. 220 (1931);
texts and articles cited in last half of note 27. People v. Sours, 31 Colo.
369 (1903).
20 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
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to do, since it would violate the doctrine of the sovereignty of
the people and would be an unwarranted usurpation of power by
the Supreme Court when such a power had not been delegated
to it. This would not only discredit the court, but would tend
to discredit our constitutional system. The amending power,
it should be noted, is not a power delegated to the federal gov-
ernment, nor a power delegated to the states, in either of which
cases limitations on the power might be presumed, but the
amending power is an independent and absolute power granted
to different branches of both governments, free from any limita-
tions in other parts of the Constitution upon the branches of
the federal government as such or the branches of the state
government as such, and unlimited except by the limits upon
the procedure of amendment set forth in Article V. The possi-
bility of abuse of the amending power is not a test of its exist-
ence. Sovereignty certainly has such a power. If sovereignty
desired to delegate the power, it certainly could do so, and if
sovereignty desired directly to exercise the power, it certainly
could do so. The 5th Article has not only delegated such a
broad power as this, but has provided for direct action by sov-
ereignty itself. Abuse by a principal is a different thing from
abuse by an agent, and an agent cannot be guilty of abuse when
he exercises only a power which has been given to him. There
is no power above the people, and the amending power of the
Constitution does not recognize any power above them. Sov-
ereignty certainly does not. The wonder is not that the amend-
ing power is so broad as we have just indicated but that any
members of the legal profession or pseudo-constitutional law-
yers should ever have thought otherwise.32
Does the power of amendment include the power to repeal a
provision in the Constitution as well as the power to change or
add to such provision? While there is no direct Supreme Court
authority on this point, state courts have answered this ques-
tion in the affirmative, and it would seem that the question
should be so answered. The amending power is broad enough
so that it includes the power to repeal both expressly and im-
pliedly.33
When is a provision in the Constitution self-executing? It is
32Note 27, supra.
33EX parte Kerby, 103 Ore. 612 (1922); Lovett v. Ferguson, 10 S. D.
44 (1897); 15 Minn. Law Rev. 224.
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self-executing if it lays down a rule sufficient for application by
the courts without supplementary legislation.
34
As we have already noted, an amendment will take effect from
the time it is adopted by the last state necessary to make up the
three-fourths majority, not from the time of the proclamation
by the secretary of state, although so far as state action is con-
cerned, the Supreme Court will not go back of the certificate of
a secretary of state and inquire into legislative proceedings.3 5
Is the validity of an amendment or a series of amendments a
judicial question for the courts, or a political question for the
legislature or executive? So far as concerns substance, it is
clearly a judicial question. But the courts have held, as we have
seen, that there are no limitations of this sort. So that in the
future no questions involving substance ought to arise.3 6 So far
as concerns procedure, the answer to the question depends upon
whether or not a legal method or a revolutionary method is em-
ployed, and whether the question is raised before adoption or
success, or after adoption or success. Where an attempt is made
to follow the legal method of amendment, whether one amend-
ment or a whole Constitution is proposed, before adoption the
question would seem to be largely a political question, because
the courts would not enjoin the legislature itself, probably be-
cause of the doctrine of separation of powers, in spite of the
fact that in such a case the legislature would be exercising the
amending power and not the power of legislation. But the
court might enjoin ministerial acts by officers of the executive
branch of the government.3 7 But after adoption, the question
of the validity of an amendment is certainly a judicial question,
and the validity of a whole Constitution thus adopted would
also be a judicial question, unless it was called a revolution.
The United States Supreme Court evidently was at first inclined
to regard both aspects of this question as a political question,
but the state courts have taken the opposite position, and now
34 Tampa Water Works Co. v. Tampa, 199 U. S. 241 (1905); Davis v.
Burke, 179 U. S. 399 (1900); Hyatt v. Allen, 54 Cal. 353 (1880); Newport
News v. Woodward, 104 Va. 58 (1905); Willis v. Mabon, 48 Minn. 140
(1892); 15 Minn. Law Rev. 227.
35 Note 22, 8upra.
36 Note 24; Contra, Livermore v. Waite, 102 Cal. 113 (1894).
Where state constitutions impose limitations on the scope of amend-
ments, probably a judicial question is raised. 14 Minn. Law Rev. 381-382.
3 7 Ellingham v. Dye, 178 Ind. 336 (1912); Loring v. Young, 239 Mass.
349 (1921).
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the Supreme Court has taken the same position.38 Where a
revolutionary rather than a legal method of amendment is fol-
lowed, different considerations are involved. Before the suc-
cess of the revolution it would seem to be a judicial question,
whether an amendment or an entire constitution is proposed,
and any persons not protected by the doctrine of the separation
of powers could be restrained by the courts.39 After the suc-
cess of a revolution, the question of the validity of the whole
Constitution is a political question,40 and it would seem that this
should be the view, though only one amendment is thus adopted
by the people. The reason for this is found in the doctrine of the
sovereignty of the people. If people who have all sovereign
power actually adopt a new Constitution as was done in the case
of the United States Constitution, and as has been done in the
case of most of the early state Constitutions, such new constitu-
tion becomes the new fundamental law and the measure of the
powers of the different branches of government, and supersedes
any old constitution, and this result should also be true if only
one amendment instead of an entire constitution is adopted.41
Can an amendment, invalid because not adopted in the legal
way when a legal method has been attempted, beconme a constitu-
tional amendment by acquiescence? This is a very important
question, since it affects the slavery amendments, which, it has
been contended, were never ratified by three-fourths of the legis-
latures of the states.42 While there may be some doubt on the
point, the safest answer is that such an amendment or amend-
ments can become constitutional by acquiescence provided such
acquiescence is for a considerable period and by the people as a
whole, though acquiescence of the people might be implied from
acquiescence by the different branches of the government. This
would seem to follow from the power to make or amend consti-
tutions by revolution.43
Could an amendment to the federal Constitution be attacked
collaterally? This question should be answered in the affirma-
3 8 Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (1849).
3 9 Ellingham v. Dye, supra.
40 Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. 59 (1874).
41 Carpenter v. Cornish, 83 N. J. L. 696 (1912); Contra, Koehler and
Lange v. Hill, 60 Iowa 543 (1883).
42 Machen, Is the 15th Amendment Void?, 23 Harv. Law Rev. 169;
Morris, The 15th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, 189 No. Am.
Rev. 82.
43 25 Ill. L. Rev. 442-444.
AMENDABILITY OF THE CONSTITUTION
tive, and it would seem as though it is almost the only way that
an amendment can be attacked, because of the difficulty of mak-
ing a direct attack.44
In providing for the amendment of the Constitution, the sov-
ereign people should make the power to amend neither too easy
nor too difficult. It would seem as though in the case of the
United States Constitution a fairly happy mean had been struck.
During the first 140 years since the adoption of the United States
Constitution, 3113 proposals of amendment have been made, but
only 24 have so appealed to Congress as to secure their proposal
by Congress, and only 19 have made a sufficient appeal to people
to secure ratification. This would seem to indicate that the
method of amendment is not too easy. Yet, during a 9 year
period, the last four amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion were proposed and ratified, which would seem to indicate
that the power of amendment is not too difficult.45
Of course, the Supreme Court has made many more changes
and additions to the Constitution than have been made by all the
nineteen amendments to the Constitution. Perhaps, if the Su-
preme Court did not have this power, the present express Con-
stitutional provision for amendment would be inadequate. But,
on the whole, it probably works better to allow the Supreme
Court to do most of the work of remodeling the Constitution to
keep it abreast with new conditions and new times, and to allow
the agencies expressly endowed with the amending process to
act only in extraordinary emergencies or when general opinion
disagrees with the opinion of the Supreme Court.
44 14 Minn. Law. Rev. 383.
45 7 Tenn. Law Rev. 299-300.
